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Marx would not tell us much more. Nor is it his fault if, from the viewpoint of a so-defined method, political economy and Marx can be taken together. At the level of formal logical description, one cannot go beyond this. In order to discriminate Marx from Ricardo, it is necessary to move from the analysis of logical forms and sequences to the analysis of the different abstractions and their relationship to the object. This is no longer the formal question of method, but the specific question of science.

Between the formal discourse on method and the specific discourse of science, there is no intermediate room. "Marxist philosophy" has tried to create this room in order to save itself, at least as methodology. There is, however, an obstacle in its path: the problem of the specific determination of science and methodology. At this point "philosophy" must stop and consider itself. By itself, it does not make it. Faced with the crucial problem of Marx's sociology, the methodology of the Marxists remains totally impotent. As a philosopher and ideologist, Della Volpe has taught us at least one thing: from the methodological viewpoint, science and methodology remain one and the same.

Once Della Volpe has lost the precise limits of Marx's discourse on the method of political economy, he has lost the distinction between what Marx said and what Marxist sociology cannot say; between the lost meaning of Marx's methodological discourse and the specific sociology of his scientific analysis is the interregnum of Della Volpe's logical and dialectical figures. This is the ambiguous kingdom of "methodology" in general, which derives from science "its" problems and at the same time asks from science all its solutions. For such a methodology, science is not a task anymore but, in fact, only a given. It seems to follow coherently that such a methodology will remain quite *indifferent* to the differential nature of scientific abstractions (so that Della Volpe cannot distinguish science from ideology without straining Marx's text, as he cannot see the difference between his "post-bourgeois democracy" and Marx's concept of "capital") since "methodologically" they are both "determinate abstractions."

Let us come to a brief conclusion. In his reduction of *theoretical* issues to questions of *methodology*, Della Volpe does not stand alone, for methodology is rooted in the Marxist tradition itself. If Marx's concepts are *assumed* to be true, verification is no longer the scholar's job. When truth is *given*, the study of *how* it is given is all that remains. In the Marxist tradition since Kautsky, philology and dogmatism have gone hand in hand. In one sense, the reduction of theory to method constitutes "Marxist philosophy" as a separate "field." In another, it is the necessary ideological counterpart and theoretical reflection of the separate role of the scholar in the division of labor of a Marxist political organization. For in the Party, strategy and theory are *in fact* "given" by the Central Committee, and Marx is *in theory* "right."

Seen in this context, the political roots of Della Volpe's philosophy become quite clear. Since his "Marxism as science" represents a break with the Italian philosophical tradition, it also seems to imply a critique of the P.C.I.'s policies of cultural continuity with the past. In reality, however, Della Volpe never questioned continuity as such, for he did save tradition in another, "international" form: that of the immediate derivation of socialist ideology from the liberal democratic philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

INTRODUCTION

Beginning with this issue, *Telos* will appear quarterly: this is to avoid the publication of encyclopedic issues such as No. 6 and at the same time to allow quicker publication of timely articles.

Since Husserl's *Crisis* has been available in English for over a year now, in this issue we are beginning a discussion of its relevance to Marxism which will continue for several issues. Although Vajda's dialogue describes Marxism as an "ideology" and phenomenology as a mere "method," he raises important theoretical questions which require elaboration. The issue concerning the relationship between Marxism and phenomenology is far from settled.

Louis Althusser and Galvano Della Volpe have succeeded in re-introducing in France and Italy respectively long-since bankrupt forms of "positivized" Marxism. The articles by George and Montano indicate the irrelevance of this pretentious nonsense and trace its roots to the social-democratic political practice of official European Communist Parties.

Continuing our efforts to indicate the political character of modern bourgeois science, this issue includes Ratner's account of contemporary psychology. Next issue will include a similar study in the field of optics by Tragu and one article by Kosok. Additional contributions and comments on these topics will be welcome.

With communes sprouting all over the United States, it is important to undertake a concrete analysis of family structure. Mihály Vajda and Agnes Heller, two students of Lukács, give a concrete account of some of the problems and implications of communal living. Revolution is not just *one* apocalyptic event which happens once and for all, after which all evil will be automatically replaced by "good." It is a developing process which must continue both *before* and *during* the actual overthrowing of the ruling classes. This presents problems which must be concretely elaborated in the *very process of changing the character of everyday life*.

Lastly, we publish another chapter of Merleau-Ponty's *Les Aventures de la Dialectique* dealing with a criticism of Lukács. Although misdirected in many respects, "Pravda" raises several problems about "orthodox" Marxism which have not been solved. A critical Marxism must take them into account.

Last but not least, this issue is dedicated to Mitchell Franklin, without whose theoretical efforts and personal interest *Telos* would not have been possible.

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TOTALITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM IN PSYCHOLOGY by Carl Ratner

Totalitarianism and individualism in psychology do not simply reflect two different schools. Rather, they embody entire philosophies which have political ramifications. Indeed, the psychological issues take on significance only when understood in this larger context.

Herbert Marcuse devotes a good deal of *Negations* to an examination of the cultural and philosophical aspects of individualism and totalitarianism. In the lead essay, "The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State," he describes individualism, or liberalism, in the following manner: "Liberalism was the social and economic theory of European industrial capitalism in the period when the actual economic bearer of capitalism was the 'individual capitalist,' the private entrepreneur in the literal sense. Despite structural variations in liberalism and its bearers from one country or period to another, a uniform foundation remains: the individual economic subject's free ownership and control of private property and the politically and legally guaranteed security of these rights."¹ The liberalist view maintains that a harmonious social balance will ensue from the competition among varying individual interests if each one is expressed freely. If there exists a public political life, a government where each interest can be represented, a separation or balance of powers, and freedom of speech and press, all conflicts will be expressed and eventually resolved through rational processes of decision-making and good judgment. In short, a smoothly functioning social order is presumed to result from the interaction of private individuals each of whom looks out solely for his own interests. This should apply in all areas of human intercourse but particularly in the economic sphere, characterized by private ownership of the means of production.

The most important quality of liberalism is its focus on the individual and its concomitant neglect of the social order: "The liberalist rationalization of economic life (as of social organization in general) is essentially *private*. It is tied to the rational practice of the individual economic subject or of a multiplicity of individual subjects. In the end, of course, the rationality of liberalist practice is supposed to demonstrate itself in the whole and characterize the whole, but this whole itself is outside the sphere of rationalization. The harmony of general and private interests is supposed to result *of itself* from the undisturbed course of private practice. On principle it is not subject to criticism, nor does it fall within the bounds of rational projects for practice."

Through this *privatization of reason*, the construction of society in accordance with reason is deprived of the end which is supposed to provide the goal (just as in irrationalism it is deprived of its beginning through the functionalization of reason). Thus, precisely the rational determination and condition of that "generality" in which the "happiness" of the individual is supposed to be realized is missing. To this extent (and only to this extent) the

reproach is correct that liberalism's task of general interest or humanity remains caught in pure abstractions. The structure and order of the whole are ultimately left to irrational forces: an accidental "harmony," a "natural balance."²

Thus, while the individual receives great attention, the goals he strives toward and the conditions of his life work themselves out according to the dictates of a natural law. Marcuse quotes Rousseau: "That which is good and conformable to order is so by the nature of things and independently of human conditions."³

Liberalist ideology never accurately expressed the reality of early capitalism. That society was torn by great differences in power, wealth, and privilege which have never been reconciled. The social order was determined not by the free expression of opposing positions and rational debate which illuminated the good of the social whole, but by the dominant bourgeois class, which denied free expression to the proletariat when they felt conditions warranted it. The principles regulating social and economic life were laws of capitalism rather than "natural" laws. In focusing on the individual, liberalist ideas served to mask the antagonisms of a hierarchically organized class society by eliminating the social order from investigation. Nonetheless, liberalism did reflect something of the nature of early capitalism, which was the ownership of the means of production by individual entrepreneurs. Financial crises and monopolization proved the insufficiency of private ownership of production and pointed toward the need for a rationally planned, socially controlled economy. This trend demanded changes in culture and philosophy, since a private, individualistic *Weltanschauung* no longer met or reflected the economic needs of the society. The reality of the social whole became evident as an influence on the individual which must be criticized and altered to achieve personal happiness. Capitalism, with its liberal ideology, had to be transcended in a socialized economy and a communally oriented ideology.

Totalitarianism is a perversion of this need. According to Marcuse, German fascism was an attempt to solve the problems engendered by the weaknesses of private enterprise and liberalism. The emphasis on "folkhood," "totality," etc., and "the strong universalist tendency does not, indeed, arise as a philosophical speculation; economic development actually requires it."⁴ However, fascism does not attack the socio-economic conditions (which is what it must do to solve the socio-economic problems) but leaves them intact and merely substitutes a collectivist ideology for the liberal one. This maneuver is designed to give the appearance of change but it actually only perpetuates the problematical socio-economic conditions. Marcuse writes: "For in the totalitarian theory of the state the foundations of this society, *i.e.*, the economic order based on private property in the means of production, are not attacked. Instead, they are only modified to the degree demanded by the monopolistic stage of this very economic order. In consequence, all contradictions that inhere in such an order and make a real totality impossible are carried over into the new stage and its

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

1. Herbert Marcuse, *Negations, Essays in Critical Theory* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1968), p. 9.

theory. Realizing the desired unifying totality would be in truth an *economic* task...⁵ Totalitarianism did not conceive of individuals directing the social conditions, but posited a society above and beyond them which was presumed to condition them. "The folk is not a structure that has originated through any human power"; it is a 'divinely willed' groundwork of human society. In this way the new social theory arrives at the equation through which it is led to the premises of irrationalist 'organicism': as a natural-organic whole, the first and last totality, the foundation and limit of all ties and obligations, is the genuine, divinely willed eternal reality in contrast with the inorganic, 'derived' reality of society. As such, owing to its origins, it is largely withdrawn from the range of all human planning and decision. Hence all attempts are 'a priori' discredited that would overcome the present anarchically conflicting strivings and needs of individuals and raise them to a true totality by means of a planned transformation of the social relations of production. The path is cleared for a 'heroic-folkish' organicism, which provides the basis necessary for totalitarian political theory to fulfill its social function."⁶

This account of the development of totalitarianism makes the following points clear. First of all, totalitarianism grows out of liberalism and may be said to be produced by it in view of liberalism's failure to acknowledge the importance of social reality and the weaknesses of private enterprise: "The turn from the liberalist to the total-authoritarian state occurs within the framework of a single social order. With regard to the unity of this economic base, we can say it is liberalism that 'produces' the total-authoritarian state out of itself, as its own consummation at a more advanced stage of development. The total-authoritarian state brings with it the organization and theory of society that corresponds to the monopolistic stage of capitalism."⁷ It follows that totalitarianism only appears to be an order different from liberalism; in fact, both are ideologies of capitalist private enterprise and contain the antagonism of individual and society. Both views separate the individual from society; liberalism neglects society and totalitarianism ignores the individual. Furthermore, while liberalism is rationalistic in comparison with totalitarianism, both views regard the creation and perpetuation of the social order as beyond human control. This hides the human element that in fact directs the society and thus keeps this control immutable. Both ideologies work against the rational control of conditions by the majority of people, which means that they work against the socialization of the economic fabric and the harmonious participation of people in a social structure that expresses their needs and desires. Finally, liberalism is impotent against totalitarianism because it has no systematic or systemic explanation for the crises which befall the culture it upholds. When such breakdowns occur, people inevitably turn to ideologies which at least appear to take account of social and economic developments; and totalitarianism is such a doctrine. Marcuse puts it as follows: "The plausibility of liberalist rationalism thus ceases immediately when, with the intensification of

5. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

social conflict and economic crises, general 'harmony' becomes increasingly improbable. At this point liberalist theory must grasp at irrational justifications. Rational critique gives up; it is all too readily prepared to acknowledge 'natural' privileges and favors. The idea of the charismatic, authoritarian leader is already preformed in the liberalist celebration of the gifted economic leader, the 'born' executive."⁸ In other words, totalitarianism makes explicit the "natural principles" that underlie liberalism and dominate its outlook.

Individualism and totalitarianism in psychology parallel this formulation of the two doctrines in politics and philosophy. On the surface, they oppose each other; however, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that they have much in common.

The individualist point of view has been most notably expounded by Rollo May, Abraham Maslow, and Carl Rogers, some of whose writings appear in a book of articles entitled *Existential Psychology*.⁹ The authors emphasize the individuality of the person, who must be considered in his totality as experiencing, coping, growing, responsible, and aware. Reducing and fragmenting his wholeness, whether in behavioristic or Freudian psychology, dehumanizes the person. The concern is solely with "the individual," and human existence is regarded as a series of encounters of individuals. Consequently, the goal of therapy is to make the person more aware of himself and others, and to help him exert his individuality, which he has heretofore suppressed under the influence of social norms. Rogers reflects this in his definition of a helping relationship (e.g., therapy) as "one in which one of the participants intends that there should come about, in one or both parties, more appreciation of, more expression of, more functional use of, the latent inner resources of the individual."¹⁰ Thus, it is the overriding concern of the individualist perspective that the individual express what is inside him. In a therapy setting, for example, the most important ingredient in being an effective therapist is "to be real". Rogers states that, "When I fall short in therapy, it is when I am unable to be what I deeply am." I "Being what I am" simply means reacting to people and things immediately and directly, as I spontaneously feel them at the moment.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

9. Rollo May, ed., *Existential Psychology* (New York, Random House, 1969). This school is liberalist in accentuating the freedom of the individual; however, it dwells on the spontaneous expression of physical/emotional existence and is less rational than traditional liberalism. This is a significant modification of the rationalism Marcuse describes, and it may be said to represent the shrinking zone of freedom enjoyed by the subject. Existentialism reflects the notion that even thought is no longer free from social domination and that people must live largely by simply doing. Understanding the world is abdicated in favor of immediate personal pleasure realized in the act. Consciousness is important not to discover order in the world, but, more egoistically, to find satisfaction for oneself. See Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 262-267, for a statement of this idea.

10. Carl Rogers, "The Characteristics of a Helping Relationship," speech delivered to the American Personnel and Guidance Association, St. Louis, Mo., 1958.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Preconceptions, plans, and reactions not generated by the immediate situation violate personal trust, since they prevent the experiencing of each person "as he is." Rollo May refers to a Dr. Efrén Ramirez, who "does not make any diagnosis and prognosis once treatment has begun 'for in our particular setting they actually obstruct, or weaken the impact of the confrontation experience.'"¹² Emphasizing the emotional and non-interpretive, non-ideological nature of his therapy, Rogers says, "It is the attitudes and feelings of the therapist, rather than his theoretical orientation, which are important." It is because Rogers refrains from interpreting or influencing his patients' experiences that his therapy is termed non-directed or client-centered.

Encounter groups clearly embody this accentuation of physical/emotional expressiveness and concern for personal issues in isolation from other matters. The emphasis on trust, honesty, and freedom of expression, as well as the provoking of intense outpourings of feeling, are well known. Additionally, these intimate confrontations occur among strangers gathered for very brief periods of time (the new "marathons" last 24 to 48 hours). Consequently, the personal revelations do not accompany or fill out social intercourse; they totally constitute it. The psychological problem becomes the foundation of interpersonal relationships; it becomes an issue in itself. Trusting others and exposing oneself are not predicated upon knowing the group members or even liking them. What they are like is not a determinant of whether or not one should trust them or reveal oneself to them. The mere fact that they exist is sufficient warrant for being intimate with them. This abstract intimacy is actually quite impersonal, because personal matters are isolated from other concerns: the personal is divorced from the person, who is not regarded in terms of his fullness and orientation toward life, or his attitudes, interests and desires. Therefore, confronting oneself and others in encounter groups substitutes intense personal outpourings for more complex, more difficult, and fuller relationships. Larger issues such as understanding oneself in terms of one's culture are avoided in favor of immediate, intuited personal relationships founded upon sensitivity and communication. This accords with the individualist beliefs that social life derives from personal experience and that awareness of the latter leads to a satisfying life that corresponds to one's needs, desires, and capabilities.

That the most critical conditions, if not the only ones, for a fulfilling life are freedom of expression and personal awareness is reflected in a study cited by Rogers which concludes that the best predictor of the behavior of adolescent delinquents is the delinquent's awareness of himself and his environment. This is found to be a more accurate indicator of whether the delinquent behavior would decrease than family climate, neighborhood and cultural influences, social experiences, and hereditary background of the subjects. Rogers explains why awareness was so important: "As these delinquents were able to accept into consciousness all the facts regarding themselves and their situations, they were free to live out all the possibilities symbolically and to choose the most satisfying course of action. But those delinquents who were unable to accept

reality into consciousness were compelled by the external circumstances of their lives to continue in a deviant course of behavior, unsatisfying in the long run."¹³ This statement has important implications, for it indicates that delinquency is caused by lack of awareness and can be eliminated through a massive and intensive education-therapy program to heighten consciousness. Delinquency is thus an individual problem and occurs only because certain people are simply ignorant. Intelligent people would never deviate from the rules; they would learn to live within them. Rejecting the norm is seen as unsatisfying; conforming to it is fulfilling. Hence, awareness is liberating not because it leads to control of the social structure but because it helps the individual live *within* the given structure: knowing what is available to him in his cultural position, the aware person can decide which of the possibilities he can utilize advantageously. Rogers implies that living in the present social system is not deleterious if we are aware of our actions and are not coerced unwittingly. Furthermore, only the unaware are "compelled by external circumstances"; awareness supposedly prevents coercion. Again, the account comes to rest at the individual level, since systems are good or bad, coercive or not, only insofar as the individual is aware or unaware of them. Consenting to a situation makes it acceptable; good and evil, free and totalitarian, are equal to awareness and blindness. Thus, merely by heightening consciousness, educators and psychologists can transform an oppressive situation into a fulfilling one. Personal growth is possible, therefore, regardless of the individual's circumstances. Thus Rogers, in his address on the characteristics of a helping relationship, can say: "Increasingly the interaction between the industrial consultant and a management group is intended [and presumably succeeds] as a helping relationship." Apparently it is equally easy to help people fulfill themselves at the highest echelons of corporate decision-making and in the solitude of a hospital. The situation is unimportant as long as there is warmth, honesty, and awareness.

Choice is a purely personal matter, according to the individualist position. The individual does not choose a society involving others; he merely chooses what he wants for himself within the existing order. Hence, his understanding of social matters serves only to aid him in obtaining private satisfaction. Each person must find his own happiness through certain socially prescribed channels. It should be emphasized that although the individual chooses from among socially provided alternatives, and although the status quo remains implicit in everything he does, nevertheless he is regarded as a free individual, who lives out unique personal projects uninfluenced by other people. As Marcuse has pointed out, the social whole is never explained or questioned; rather, it is taken for granted while attention is focused upon the individual,¹⁴ who makes decisions in a lonely, anguished state, having no one to turn to or rely upon. Since his

13. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

14. Certain portions of the social life may be questioned, such as taboos prohibiting pre- or extra-marital sexual relationships, homosexuality, smoking pot, and the like, and these may be rejected as encroaching on personal liberty. However, the socio-economic structure as a whole remains unexamined; and political commitment is eschewed as an infringement on personal freedom and a loss of identity in oversized concerns.

12. Rollo May, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

actions are purely personal, he alone bears the responsibility for their outcome; and the only basis he has is his own limited awareness. For Rollo May, *et al.*, the ultimate aloneness of the individual¹⁵ and the "agonizing burden of freedom"¹⁶ are ontological categories of existence which must be endured by all men. This *Angst* is merely the other side of the coin from complete autonomy and isolation; and it is certainly no accident that the notions of awareness, fulfillment, and honesty are laden with pessimism, uncertainty, and despair.

Behavioristic psychology, on the other hand, attempts to deal with man's social nature and declares its fundamental opposition to individualistic notions and subjective experience. Behaviorism justifies its disregard for personal acts by appealing to scientific notions of objectivity which demand public confirmation of data. The exclusion from significance of what goes on within the subject has frequently and correctly been condemned as totalitarian: behaviorism is interested only in the social or public aspect of the individual, not in how he might dissent from the given social order or how he might change it.¹⁷

The totalitarianism of behaviorism is well illustrated in a recent book candidly entitled *Control of Human Behavior*, a collection of studies dealing with the modification of behavior in various settings. The reader is reminded that he is witnessing a purely scientific undertaking; that human behavior is being controlled simply for the sake of efficiency, not for any ideological reasons. The processes dealt with are also supposedly chosen on the basis of scientific considerations. "The old, defunct explanatory concepts of knowledge, meaning, mind, or symbolic processes have never offered the possibility of manipulation or control; but behavior, verbal or otherwise, can be controlled with ease and precision."¹⁸ An exemplary case of totalitarian psychology involved a 47 year-old woman diagnosed as a chronic schizophrenic and hospitalized for nine years. She manifested three troublesome behaviors which were the objects of modification: stealing food from the hospital cafeteria, hoarding towels, and wearing excessive clothing. In accordance with the prevailing methodology and conception of the individual, these three behaviors were treated separately: there was no attempt to determine whether they expressed a coherent relation of the subject to her world, what they meant to her, or why she performed them; nor was she informed that experimental manipulations (essentially punishment) were to be instituted. The psychologists sought to negatively reinforce stealing food and wearing excessive clothing and to satiate the towel-hoarding behavior. Thus they had her deprived of meals when she manifested the former two behaviors; and she was inundated with towels by the nurses, who would give her up to sixty towels daily until eventually she had 600 towels in her room! The patient was never forewarned about these humiliating procedures nor was she ever consulted or advised about

15. Rollo May *op. cit.*, p. 54.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

17. See Floyd W. Matson, *The Broken Image* (New York, Doubleday and Co., 1964), Part I, for a brief history of this outlook.

18. Ulrich, Staehnik, Mabry, *Control of Human Behavior* (Illinois, Scott & Foresman, 1966), p. 76.

their purpose. Indeed, when the patient displayed concern over the sudden changes in her life, she was ignored: "The patient displayed some emotional behavior in each experiment, but each time it subsided when social reinforcement [*i.e.*, attention] was not forthcoming."¹⁹ Treatment was considered successful if the patient became more sociable with other patients and if she was accepted back into society: "As far as the patient's relatives are concerned, the index of improvement or deterioration is the readily observable behavior and not a detailed account of the mechanics of the mental apparatus. [T]he current emphasis in psychotherapy is on 'mental-conflict resolution' and little attention is given to dealing directly with the behavioral problems which prevent the patient from returning to the community."²⁰ Commenting on the success of their therapeutic technique, the authors state: "About this time [at the conclusion of the behavior treatment] the patient's parents came to visit her and insisted on taking her home on a visit. This was the first time during the patient's nine years of hospitalization that her parents had asked to take her out. They remarked that previously they had not been interested in taking her out because the patient's excessive dressing, in addition to her weight, made her look like a 'circus freak.'"²¹ Thus, behavior modification was successful because the parents, who disavowed their daughter because she *looked* strange, accepted her now that her appearance and manner were respectable. The psychologists, of course, make no mention of her mental state since it is not scientifically measurable and is, therefore, "an old, defunct explanatory concept."

It is evident that totalitarian and individualist psychology differ in many ways. Behaviorism is concerned with the prediction and control of behavior and with its measurement and quantification. The person is regarded as a conglomeration of responses established and elicited by well-defined environmental stimuli and variables, and as being passive in that he does not initiate action but only reacts to what is presented from without. Finally, he is viewed as entirely public: whatever cannot be observed, measured, and manipulated socially is disregarded. The aim of behaviorism is to keep the individual in conformity with social demands, and if he breaks down he must be fixed and returned to fulfill his obligations. Individualist psychology, on the other hand, considers the individual as an active, responsible unity behaving in accordance with what is best for him and expressing what he feels is important. Individuality is sacred and social restraints are to be minimized. The person's private experiences should be left to him and not observed, measured, or controlled. In short, individualism stresses "free will" whereas behaviorism emphasizes "determinism."

In line with Marcuse's comments, we shall see that the two positions actually have much in common and that individualism does not provide an effective alternative to totalitarianism. In the first place, a closer look at the behavioristic treatment of the schizophrenic woman discloses that the psychologists' entire focus was on the patient and not on the relatives, the

19. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

society at large, or the conditions in the hospital. Analysis to determine *why* the woman acted in her peculiar manner might have illuminated what she was reacting to. The study ignored these conditions and dealt only with the socially aberrant behaviors of the individual. No alterations were made on the social and physical environment surrounding the patient: the hospital continued to operate according to the usual principles and procedures, the overall role of the patient remained unchanged, the activities of the ward went on as always, and the relatives maintained their views of good and bad. The only changes made were the number of towels and meals the patient received each day. Quantities of food and towels were regarded by the psychologists as significant factors in curing the psychotic disorganization of a 47-year-old woman who had been hospitalized for nine years. Behavioristic neglect of significant social relations is further evidenced in making the relatives' acceptance of the patient the final criterion of her mental health. The goal of behavior modification is clearly to eliminate socially undesirable responses from the patient's repertoire and to make her socially acceptable. The values of her relatives remained unchanged even though the woman was perceived largely on the superficial level of her appearance.

This example should demonstrate that totalitarian psychology is a doctrine not of the social nature of man, since it takes social reality for granted and totally ignores it, but of certain abstract laws of behavior. It is preoccupied with the influence on behavior of the number of meals a person eats per day, the number of towels he has in his room, and the like. The concern is for variables such as schedules of reinforcement and quantity of reinforcement, and how they strengthen or weaken specific behaviors. However, the *content* of the behavior, the content of the reinforcers, and the content of the larger social world are disregarded. Totalitarian psychology is concerned not with the content of life but with abstract laws that are supposed to govern it. As such, this psychology examines neither the individual's experience nor the social order. Like the totalitarian ideology described by Marcuse, behaviorism does not examine the quality of life or seek to raise individuality to the level of social community. Instead, it leaves the content of life intact and imposes a formal structural sociality which stands over and above the individual and subsumes him within it. As with totalitarian ideology in general, behaviorism does not seek to alter the content of experience — indeed, what is reinforced is decided by the given society — but only to induce the prescribed content into experience with greater efficiency.²² Like fascist ideology, behaviorism obscures the nature of reality by concentrating on techniques of control and assuming a mysterious social organization produced by universal conditioning to a common set of norms. The norms' origin, *i.e.*, who conditioned the first conditioners, remains unaccounted for, as does the fact that people's efforts do change social structures. The entire social process is considered as outside human volition: it exists as part of nature

22. The irrationalist theory of totalitarianism is "essentially anti-materialist, for it must defame the worldly happiness of man that can be brought about only through a rational organization of society and replace it with other, less 'palpable' values." Marcuse, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

and follows "natural laws." Instead of exposing the intentionality of the ruling class that controls society, behaviorism makes it seem as though one is responsible for it. Like fascist ideology, behaviorism is a collectivist mask of the failure of individualism; and because it hides reality it prevents true collectivist action. It appears to meet the necessities of the situation while, in actuality, it prevents the occurrence of what is necessary. Behaviorism thus posits a false sociality, one which is not the result of individuals coming together to realize common ends and purposes but which stands above them as behavioral rules. Accordingly, social life consists in each person's obeying some higher law and thus does not involve social relatedness.

The individualism underlying totalitarian psychology has been described best by the gestalt psychologist Solomon Asch in his book *Social Psychology*. Asch shows clearly that the behavioristic view of man is non-social. In the first place, "It is a cardinal assumption of both the behavioristic and the Freudian systems that man is an ego acting according to the pleasure-pain principle."²³ Underlying the behavioristic preoccupation with reinforcement and punishment is the belief that organisms do what they have been rewarded for or that they seek pleasure. Behaviorism is thus a doctrine of hedonism in which the sole basis for organismic activity is pleasure for the performer. Asch points out that this view regards the individual as a social atom, unconcerned about anything or anyone except in terms of his own pleasure: the other is important only insofar as he facilitates or interferes with the subject. This viewpoint destroys any possibility (much less desire) of understanding an other, since it "presupposes that the actions of a person are not something that we understand as growing out of his situation and character; they are 'stimuli' or cues that enforce responses in us in accordance with past rewards and punishments."²⁴ Indeed, behaviorism destroys even the fact that the other is *alive*: "There is a radical side to the stimulus-response approach. It views social action as a complication of action to objects and proposes to deal with persons as if they were inanimate, though highly complex. It would reduce action between persons to a form requiring no principles other than those involved in reacting to a buzzer or a light in a conditioning experiment."²⁵ Behaviorism rules out any notion of social life. All behavior is egocentric, aimed at satisfying only the actor. There is no reaching out toward another, no understanding him, no sympathy for him. The subject is no different *in* a social situation than he is *out* of one, since the others involved might just as well be flashing lights. Complex social activities are simply derivatives of elementary laws of behavior which govern the activities of all organisms. "Both instinct and habit psychologies start with 'primary' motives, which have a fixed and natively given content; they view all later interests and concerns as 'derived,' in the sense that they obtain their energy and significance from their connection with selected biological needs. New interests and concerns become means in the service of old ends. . . . Art, science and technology cease to mark a transformation of needs in new, human directions; they are instead

23. Solomon Asch, *Social Psychology* (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1952), p. 20.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

instrumentalities to pre-human, pre-social ends."²⁶

Finally, because the basis of human experience is seen as arbitrary association and conditioning, behaviorism concludes that beliefs and values can be manipulated arbitrarily, without regard to the content and meaning of the given situation.²⁷ "We see fully the import of current psychological doctrines when we realize that they virtually deny (though for different reasons) the presence of an objective interest in the surroundings, that they convert the process of profiting from experience, which is often one of exploration and discovery, into the mechanical formation of habits in the service of ego-needs."²⁸ Asch points out that this view of the common man is used to support elitist notions declaring the necessity of leaders who make the discoveries and maintain the social order, endeavors which remain beyond the capacity of the ordinary person.²⁹ Thus, totalitarianism thrives on the purported individualism and social isolation of the common man and uses this doctrine to justify itself.

It is evident that the liberalism of Rogers, *et al.*, and totalitarian behaviorism are both individualistic in their concentration on individual behavior and their neglect of social conditions. The particular is not viewed in relation to its context, since the individual is regarded as primary and sociality is a derivative phenomenon. Removed from a contextual analysis, the individual is seen by the liberalist psychologists as embodying certain universal characteristics such as responsibility, activity, trustworthiness, honesty, and is seen by the behaviorists as responding according to quantities and frequencies or reinforcement, social distance, group size, similarity of attitudes, level of self-esteem, etc.³⁰ Both schools ultimately reach the level of universal psychological variables, although they choose different variables as significant.³¹

26. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

27. Asch devotes entire chapters to refuting this passive view of man, and he shows how subjects do attempt to make sense out of even the trivial, non-sensical, boring material used in most psychological studies.

28. Solomon Asch, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

29. Of course, it is never explained how these leaders come to have psychology different from the rest of us. They remain the unconditioned conditioners.

30. Lucien Goldmann remarks: "We have already spoken of the inadequacies of the new descriptive methods of contemporary sociology and of the separation of theory from concrete research. The common factor running through tendencies which are apparently different and even opposed is the *radical elimination of every historical element* from the study of human facts. On the theoretical level this gives rise to the tendency, ever more pronounced, to substitute for sociology a kind of pseudo-social psychology which distorts the facts all the more by eliminating every historical element from the psychological life of individuals; it seeks rather to make of the psychological life the explanatory key to mass phenomena." *The Human Sciences and Philosophy* (London, Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1969), p. 71.

31. The mere positing of such qualities, without a concrete understanding of their origin or content, leaves each position unable to account for the facts the other side marshals. Rogers has stated that although he fervently believes man

It is interesting that removing an individual from context and regarding him *particularistically* entails, at the same time, regarding him abstractly and formally as embodying *universal*, general qualities and following "natural" laws. It is also noteworthy that totalitarianism and liberalism arrive at this contradiction from opposite starting points. Behaviorism begins by considering only the social and ignoring the individual, human basis of society and the human needs satisfied and frustrated by the culture. This bias leaves a social order without politics, peculiar modes of organization of activities, or interest groups, since culture is not conceived as fulfilling human interests and purposes but rather as a result or sum of conditional individual behaviors which *happen* to occur in the presence of other people. Liberalism commences with the isolated individual who must be regarded as embodying abstract, universal qualities not specific to or reflective of any particular culture. Whereas these non-contextual particularisms become universalistic, conversely in each case the universalism is static and situation-bound and actually reflects the *status quo*. This occurs in part because both liberalism and behaviorism regard man as anti-social and as unable to construct a new social order.³² Contributing to this deficiency is the failure by both schools to appreciate purposive action directed to well-conceived goals. Behaviorism and liberalism propose a homeostatic model of man according to which he strives to live for the moment and reduce tension. The individualist emphasis on elimination of evaluations, interpretations, and constraints on behavior, as epitomized in such current slogans as "do you own thing" and "let it all hang out," are not far removed from the equally egocentric hedonism of the positive reinforcement doctrine. In both approaches, the discrete act is the sole concern. One justifies this by an appeal to spontaneity, whereas the other considers organismic activity as the result and sum of specific responses reinforced in the past. Furthermore, behaviorism and liberalism view ethics as subjective and thus compound the difficulty of criticizing one order and preparing a new one. Behaviorism adheres to this objectivist bias in considering itself "value-free" and free of all subjective mental constructs. Behavioral control and analysis are regarded as technical problems outside the scope of ethics, politics, and ideology.³³ Individualism, on the other hand, necessarily views

has free will, Skinner has successfully demonstrated that man is determined; and we must live with the paradox of both views. Because Rogers cannot explain Skinner's findings, *i.e.*, if man has free will why is he oppressed and why doesn't he simply decide to be free, his position becomes a matter of faith. Skinner faces the same problem, and continues to appeal to more accurate methods of recording past reinforcements as a means of predicting and explaining behaviors which do not appear to have been "caused" by previous rewards.

32. Asch says: "It is noteworthy that both the individualistic and group-centered doctrines introduce an external relation between individual and group; both neglect the essential problem of social psychology - how individuals create the reality of groups and how the latter control their further actions." *Op. cit.*, p. 256.

33. Skinner makes this point in *Walden Two* where he complains that the problems of today are caused by the inefficient use of behavioral engineering methods. He sets up his utopian community in line with the efficient utilization of such techniques and never discusses politics or ideology.

ethics and goals as subjective because a social ethic demanding common ends and a social organization influencing everyone would restrict personal freedom. Thus the two approaches converge on a view that ties man to the present society.

This becomes even clearer in the notion of experience. For behaviorism and individualism, experience is a thing-in-itself unrelated to other things, and therefore static. Totalitarian psychology conceives of experience (which strict behaviorists like Skinner equate with behavioral responses) as entirely social; thus, individuals in similar social positions have similar, if not identical, experiences.³⁴ From any vantage point with its established rewards and punishments, there can be only one experience or definition of what is encountered since only one response will be reinforced in that situation. Learning from others and broadening one's perspective is precluded since the other has the *same* experience as the subject and therefore there is nothing new to learn. Correspondingly, in conceiving of each person's experience as unique, inaccessible, and separate from everyone else's, individualism also freezes experience and locks it within itself as something impossible to share. In this case, there can be no learning from another because he has completely *different* experiences. For both schools, then, experience is locked within itself and cannot be broadened through interpersonal contact. The individual is not expansive or outward-going but self-centered and withdrawn, and this attitude stifles inquiry and perpetuates given modes of activity.

Although these characteristics are important, the major and most obvious reason that the formalism of individualism and behaviorism reflects the *status quo* is that it does not attack what is given. Liberal-individualist protests leave given reality intact because only formal aspects of the *status quo* such as suppression of feelings, hypocrisy, and the instrumentalization of people into objects of manipulation are attacked, while its goals and content are ignored. Consequently, new forms of behavior — e.g., spontaneity and honesty — will continue to express the old content. For instance, Rogers defines the general quality of dependability, trustworthiness, and honesty as a situation in which "whatever feeling or attitude I am expressing would be matched by my awareness of that attitude. When this is true, then I am a unified or integrated

person in that moment, and hence I can be whatever I deeply am."³⁵ It doesn't matter *what* one expresses so long as one is aware of what is being expressed. The old content can thus be readily assimilated into the new *manner* of communicating. Since the cultural content is not recognized and countered, the spontaneity, honesty, and involvement of the liberated person will be that of a spontaneous, honest, loving member of this culture and will express the contradictions and frustrations of capitalist society. Spontaneity, honesty, etc., must be regarded as depending on the culture for their content, not as abstract universals which exist unchanged across cultures. It is essential to specify the *kind* of love one seeks rather than merely to try to love *in general* (which will turn out to be love as it is possible in this particular society). The attempt at substituting certain positive values (such as love) for negative ones (such as uninvolvedness) takes place within the culture's definition of the terms, which legitimates and perpetuates the given order. The blind endeavor to bring people together in harmony and tranquility cannot succeed in the absence of a radical redefinition of these values. It is no wonder then that therapy fails to promote fundamental change in people. Marcuse discusses this issue in his essay "On Hedonism": "The apologetic aspect of hedonism is to be found in hedonism's abstract conception of the subjective side of happiness, in its inability to distinguish between true and false wants and interests and between true and false enjoyment. It accepts the wants and interests of individuals as simply given and as valuable in themselves. Yet these wants and interests themselves, and not merely their gratification, already contain the stunted growth, the repression, the untruth with which men grow up in a class society. The affirmation of the one already contains the affirmation of the other."³⁶ "The restriction of happiness to the sphere of consumption, which appears separated from the process of production, stabilizes the particularity and the subjectivity of happiness in a society in which rational unity of the process of production and consumption, of labor and enjoyment, has not been brought about."³⁷

The content of the given society also intrudes into the abstract variables employed by behaviorism. Although this school claims to be value-free and non-ideological, its formalism incorporates the values of the culture; thus, it is an instrument of what that culture values. The "elementary forms of behavior" which portray human activity as an egocentric pursuit of reinforcement coincide with a competitive economy founded on private ownership of means of production and aimed at increasing profit. The behavior reinforced is that which is socially acceptable; and notions of status, role, self-concept, etc., are always defined in terms of their use in this society. Marcuse discusses a study on political activity which operationally defined political activity as voting, personal communication with legislators, etc.³⁸ He points out that this definition confines the investigation to what is ordinarily taken to be political activity and therefore fails to examine broader questions which might illuminate what such

35. Carl Rogers, *op. cit.*

36. Herbert Marcuse, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 173.

38. Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1964), pp. 118-120.

34. Vide Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (New York, Doubleday, 1959), for an extended discussion of the complete and total socialization of experience. Goffman relegates individual or personal interpretation of the social role to a "backstage area" which is virtually never revealed. This moderate behaviorism, which allows for some experience, is not significantly different from the hard line of Skinner since both deny private experience which is not completely congruent with existent social norms. As Lucien Goldmann says: "The partisans of positivistic and descriptive methods — in the best cases, when they are not dealing solely with institutions and external behavior — recognize consciousness only as a *real* consciousness which exists *now*. Once they make the concession of acknowledging a non-physical reality, they demand, at the very least, that it possess the principal qualities of the material world. Thus it is a *different*, but analogous domain that they decide to add to the physico-chemical sciences." *Op. cit.*, p. 112.

activity could or should be. Commenting on this mode of social science, he states: "In other words, the criteria for judging a given state of affairs are those offered by (or, since they are those of a well-functioning and firmly established social system, imposed by) the given state of affairs. The analysis is 'locked'; the range of judgment is confined within a context in which the facts are made, man-made, and in which their meaning, function and development are determined."³⁹ According to this operational definition of political activity, it is impossible even to ask why this activity exists, whether it should exist, and what other types might exist. The criteria for research are simply taken from the given modes of political activity, which means that political activity is investigated from the standpoint of ordinary occurrence. This fact accounts for the circular, self-validating, trivial nature of these studies which do not even adequately describe the facts. The study cited dealt only with the most common phenomena and not at all with less popularly known activities such as technical and economic contacts between corporate business and government and between key corporations themselves. Thus, this kind of descriptive analysis "blocks the apprehension of facts and becomes an element of the ideology that sustains the facts."⁴⁰

The manner in which this research takes common activities at face value is extremely subjective, since there is no determination as to whether they are objectively valuable or whether they even represent actual events. This subjectivism is characteristic of all operational definitions of psychological phenomena, which show clearly how "pure objectivity" becomes subjective. Psychological processes are defined operationally according to the way in which "the reinforcing community," i.e., the given culture, regards the behavior. Thus, operant conditioning studies "the behavioral effects of environmental circumstances that are thought to produce emotion. These are situations in which a reinforcing community would reinforce the naming of the appropriate emotion by a person." For example, "fear is studied as . . . a situation in which we would agree with the person, hence reinforcing his response, if he said he was afraid."⁴¹ Thus, emotions and other psychological events are entirely defined by public opinion, which is simply accepted at face value. It is remarkable that glib methods such as these are upheld as rigorous, objective, and scientific.

The elementarism of behavioristic social science contributes to its conservatism and subjectivism, as C. Wright Mills has pointed out: "If there is one line of orientation historically implicit in American social science, surely it is the bias toward scattered studies, toward factual surveys and the accompanying dogma of the pluralist confusion of causes. These are essential features of liberal practicality as a style of social study. As social scientists of milieu, we must become aware of many little causes; to act intelligently, as practical men, we must be piecemeal reformers of milieu, one here and one there"

If we break a society into tiny 'factors,' naturally we shall then need quite a

few of them to account for something and we can never be sure that we have hold of them at all. *A merely formal emphasis upon 'the organic whole' [i.e., social-environmental conditions], plus a failure to consider the adequate causes - which are usually structural - plus a compulsion to examine only one situation at a time - such ideas do make it difficult to understand the structure of the status quo.*"⁴²

This elementarism of positivist social science also characterizes the liberal-individualist school, which derives sociality from individual behavior. Both approaches contend that alteration of social life can and must occur through changes in individuals. Behaviorists claim that new behaviors will be reinforced (why or how is never explained), and individualists argue that change takes place when each person decides to live differently. A process of averaging is envisaged such that at some point there are more new elements than old, which means that at least most of the society is different. A new whole is created when a sufficient number of parts (behaviors) have changed; the whole equals the sum of the parts. Change is a process of reforming elements; attention is not directed at the structure of relationships. One assumption of this theory is that each component carries equal weight: if a few parts were as influential as many it would be almost impossible to outweigh the minority. Unfortunately, a class society does contain such an unequal distribution of power, which makes the elementarist program a utopian dream. A corresponding error is the assumption that the old, well-entrenched structure exerts no influence on the parts, which are free to develop independently of it without conflicting with it. This notion implies that the system need not be attacked; it is sufficient to oppose specific evil individuals and procedures and to substitute good people and procedures. However, it inevitably happens that the new parts are fitted into the old structure; and because their actions are confined by this system, the elementarist position finally establishes "realms of satisfaction" such as weekend football games, vacations, and the weekly hour with the therapist, where the undesired aspects of life can be avoided at least temporarily. Of course, the day to day routine which consumes most of the person's time and energy conforms to the old rules, but there is always that bit of fun or new piece of legislation to look forward to.

Thus, the severing of man from society by behaviorism and individualism results in a particularism which becomes a universalism which, in turn, is actually a particularism: society is neglected, and analysis remains at the level of individual behavior. Since this behavior is not seen as reflecting particular historical conditions, it is regarded as universal. Operating beneath these myths is the fact that the behaviors are influenced by, and are therefore expressions of, the given society. In this process of mystification, each psychological doctrine gives up its major premises. Behaviorism ceases to be strictly social and objective and becomes a superficial investigation of behaviors that, according to behaviorists, have no rational basis or social importance. Conversely, individualism ceases to be a doctrine of the free individual and winds up with a

39. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

41. C. S. Reynolds, *A Primer of Operant Conditioning* (Illinois, Scott & Foresman, 1968), p. 121.

42. C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York, Grove Press, 1961), pp. 85-86, emphasis added.

despairing, impotent person who must choose among socially provided alternatives. Although both schools lose their major premises and appear to turn into their opposites, they do not *in fact* become their opposites any more than they actualized what they sought to *be*. In tending toward an analysis of individuals, behaviorism does not attribute any significance to them since they are the object of natural laws. Nor does liberalism, in its acceptance of the given society, illuminate the quality and significance of that society, which is taken for granted. Thus at the same time that each position loses itself, what it tends to become is also obliterated: the individual behavior studied by behaviorism de-emphasizes the individual, and the social context implicit in individualism is disregarded. Therefore, each position is neither fully itself nor its opposite. They are abstract doctrines of sociality and individuality which deal neither with the social nor the individual. Instead, both deal with seemingly universal characteristics of the individual which are actually reflections of the *status quo*. Positing a society without individuals or individuals without a society produces an abstract universalized individual who is neither an individual (since he is merely the embodiment of universal tendencies), nor a social being (since he doesn't exist in any society). Divorcing man from culture and attempting to consider only one of these aspects obscures both the social structure and the capacities of the individuals. This separation prevents the examination and changing of the status quo, because it becomes universalized as a contentless, formal, general quality which is permanent and omnipresent. It also renders the human subject passive: transcendence of the given is ruled out. Man becomes finite and incapable of going beyond the "facts of life."

The individualist and behaviorist outlooks have counterparts in the views of individuals, and corresponding contradictions appear here. The anti-Semite and the liberal, described by Sartre in his book *Anti-Semite and Jew*⁴³ illustrate the commonality of a holism which ignores particulars and a particularism which denies general categories. The anti-Semite regards virtually all Jews as similar and as belonging to a group which has certain evil traits. His prejudice is not open to disconfirmation, because any particular Jew is *a priori* categorized with other Jews. The prejudiced person lives in a world of rigid cognitive categories, and any experience is automatically referred to a pre-set class of events which approximates its general and superficial characteristics. These categories are immutable because discrepant elements are not allowed to conflict with what the anti-Semite already believes. Clearly, prejudice regards only the general or the whole, and excludes the particular member from any significance beyond that of representing the category.

The liberal or democrat, on the other hand, approaches everyone as an individual and claims to have no categories which might channel experience so as to violate its purity and immediacy. Individuals must be appreciated for what they are, and their individuality must not be destroyed by viewing them from a certain point of view or by holding any presuppositions. This, of course, describes Rogers' refusal to make interpretations of his patients in therapy. Clearly, this perspective deals solely with the particular and seeks to abolish

categories and general structures. To place the individual in a broader context extending beyond him and not expressing *only* him is to distort him.

Sartre's analysis reveals that these characterizations must be refined. In the first place, the categorical nature of prejudice must be examined. Sartre states that the anti-Semite's general and overriding conception of the Jew is more an emotional, passionate belief than a reasoned, analytical judgment which encompasses a body of information defining "Jewishness." The anti-Semite avoids open-ended reasoning and substitutes a fixed set of beliefs which guarantees certainty, stability, and direction. The prejudiced categories in no way encompass the full range of information pertinent to the subject; instead, they serve to limit his experience by confining it to pre-set *a priori* notions. Prejudiced categories fragment the nature of the Jew by admitting only a certain limited part of his being; and what is admitted is usually not characteristic of Jews, since the anti-Semite has not derived his categories from experience. The prejudiced categories are thus perversions of what categories ought to be, *i.e.*, general frames of reference which integrate diverse aspects of a phenomenon into a coherent, tangible whole. Thus, the anti-Semite never seeks to understand Jews in terms of the social conditions they face, but instead explains their actions by the nature of the Jewish person. The anti-Semite believes that the given social structure is the best one possible and that any problems are caused by the evil Jews who wish to destroy it. This unwillingness of the bigot to perceive problems in terms of the conditions that engender them, and the substitution for this analysis of a particularistic outlook which locates the causes of problems in the inherent properties of individuals, is expressed in Sartre's statement: "[A]nti-Semitism channels revolutionary drives toward the destruction of *certain men, not of institutions*. An anti-Semite mob will consider it has done enough when it has massacred some Jews and burned a few synagogues. It represents, therefore, a safety valve for the owning classes, who encourage it and thus substitute for a dangerous hate against their regime a beneficent hate against *particular people*."⁴⁴ (Emphasis added.)

Similarly, the liberal faces a similar contradiction in approaching people entirely as individuals, without regard for their concrete historical conditions: "The Jews have one friend, however, the democrat. But he is a feeble protector. No doubt he proclaims that all men have equal rights; no doubt he has founded the League for the Rights of Man; but his own declarations show the weakness of his position. In the eighteenth century, once and for all, he made his choice: the analytic spirit. He has no eyes for the concrete syntheses with which history confronts him. He recognizes neither Jew, nor Arab, nor Negro, nor bourgeois, nor worker. He resolves all collectivities into individual elements. To him, a physical body is a collection of molecules; a social body, a collection of individuals. And by individual he means the incarnation in a single example of the universal traits which make up human nature."⁴⁵ The contradiction of the liberal position lies in the fact that in eschewing all categories, one large category remains: universal man. Although he commences from an individualistic

44. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

43. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew* (New York, Schocken, 1948).

perspective, "the democrat, like the scientist, fails to see the particular case, to him the individual is only an ensemble of universal traits."⁴⁶ These traits, such as anxiety, frustration, aggression, fear of death, and loneliness, are postulated as man's eternal nature, which is important to the liberal because it means that all people are fundamentally alike and that harmony and equality are possible if mankind will only recognize its common nature. Antagonism can be resolved through reason, which will illuminate the underlying harmony and expose the stupidity of conflict. Discord, like deviancy, is a problem resulting from ignorance of the natural order of the whole. Universalism, then (embodied, for example, in rationalism), attempts to overcome the differences and particularist conceptions that separate people. This passion for reason, which is actually a passion for the universal, is described by Sartre in the following terms: "Of all things in the world, reason is the most widely shared; it belongs to everybody and nobody; it is the same to all. If reason exists, then there is no French truth or German truth; there is no Negro truth or Jewish truth. There is only one Truth, and he is best who wins it. In the face of universal and eternal laws, man himself is universal. There are no more Jews or Poles; there are men who live in Poland, others who are designated 'of Jewish faith' on their family papers, and agreement is always possible among them as soon as discussion bears on the universal."⁴⁷

We are left with the conclusion that the bigot and the democrat, although they differ somewhat in their outlooks, have fundamentally the same perspective with identical contradictions. The former person seems to categorize and to deny the particular, yet he is also basically particularistic. The latter appears to be individualistic and to deny all categories and groupings, yet he is also categorical in his dealing with universal qualities. Neither approach touches on the conditions confronting the outcast, how he contributes to them, or how he might alter them. Rather, both positions deal with formal, static psychological variables considered as intrinsic to individuals. Finally, neither the democrat nor the bigot understands his own contribution to what he sees in others. The fact is observed that he is making a historically and psychologically grounded choice of what to perceive; and he regards his judgments as determined entirely by those aspects of people that impose themselves on him. Since the individualist and prejudiced outlooks obscure the nature of the perceiver, they are both totalitarian and alienating.⁴⁸

46. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

48. In the preface to *The Phenomenology of Mind*, Hegel discusses two modes of thought analogous to the prejudiced and individualist outlooks. On one hand there is the type of thinking that approaches each object individually, skipping from notion to notion. The other type is dogmatic, argumentative thinking that categorizes everything and never gets to see what the object is really like. According to Hegel, both views are abstract in that they fail to grasp the object in its determinateness or in its potential panoply of relations. Both views are static and trap the object in one mode of being instead of freeing it to enter into new relations and thus to realize its potential forms of existence. The

The impoverishment of the perceiver who divorces the particular from the general is revealed in the following example taken from the work of Kurt Goldstein, a brain pathologist. Goldstein argues that in certain instances, damage to an area of the brain cortex not only impairs specific abilities which depend on the damaged area, but also produce a more general impairment which Goldstein calls "loss of the abstract attitude." In the case of F. Lanuti,⁴⁹ a patient of Goldstein's for nine years, the loss of abstract attitude was illustrated on the one hand by an inability to grasp the wholeness or general structure of things. He had no conception of spatial organization or of the continuity of time. Objects

individualistic type of thought becomes immersed in — determined by — the object and consequently fails to direct it or situate it. This leaves the object "in itself" or unactualized, and also obscures the thinking subject from himself. Hegel says this type should be called "material thinking — an accidental consciousness that is merely absorbed in the material and therefore finds it hard to lift the self at the same time clear out of the material to be with itself." Argumentative thinking, on the other hand, remains aloof from the object and looks down on it, "merely being the arbitrary moving principle of the content." The object is at rest and carries its attributes unmoved. Argumentative thinking attaches fixed attributes to the object and completely defines and determines it. Because the object does not grow through its qualities, it remains constant, which leaves the dogmatic thinker unenriched and stultified. In contrast to these impoverishing *Weltanschauungen*, a truly enriching philosophical perspective would consist in learning "that what one supposed was not what one was supposed to suppose." Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel: Texts and Commentary* (New York, Doubleday, 1965), pp. 88-96. In "Who Thinks Abstractly," Hegel discusses the example of a murderer about to be executed. A woman declares that he is handsome; the populace can't understand how a murderer can be handsome. "This is abstract thinking: to see nothing in the murderer except the abstract fact that he is a murderer, and to annul all other human essence in him with this simple quality." This kind of abstraction is, of course, prejudice. The other type of abstraction Hegel mentions entails losing all concern for what the murderer has done — as well as for his fate — and submerging his act in a feeling for him "as a person." "It is quite different in refined, sentimental circles — in Leipzig. There they strewed and bound flowers on the wheel and on the criminal who was tied to it. — But this again is the opposite abstraction. . . . The wheel in Leipzig . . . wreathed with violets and poppies, is a reconciliation *a la* Kotzebue, a kind of slovenly sociability between sentimentality and badness." The proper attitude, which recognizes the man's position and his acts but which does not confine him to them, is expressed by a "common old woman." "The severed head had been placed on the scaffold, and the sun was shining. How beautifully, she said, the sun of God's grace shines on Binder's head! . . . This woman saw that the murderer's head was struck by the sunshine and thus was still worthy of it. She raised it from the punishment of the scaffold into the sunny grace of God; and instead of accomplishing the reconciliation with violets and sentimental vanity, saw him accepted in grace in the higher sun." Kaufmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-117.

49. E. Hanfmann, M. Rickers-Ovsiankina, and K. Goldstein, "Case Lanuti: Extreme Concretization of Behavior Due to Damage of the Brain Cortex," *Psychological Monographs*, 1944, vol. 57, no. 4, whole no. 264.

were recognized by outstanding details, not by their entire fullness. Matches, for example, were recognized only by their combustibility, and when a match did not light, Lanuti believed it was not a match. When the bobbed hair of a woman was pointed out to Lanuti, he immediately called the woman a man since the hair did not appear like women's hair. An egg was judged to be a ball because it was round. Finally, the lack of an integrative capacity was revealed in Lanuti's failure at solving jigsaw puzzles which required placing parts together to form a larger picture. "The patient did not appreciate the spatial relationships of the parts of the puzzle to each other. Instead he tried to follow some isolated arbitrary clues, or to create such clues when they were lacking, but did not succeed in producing clues that would be adequate for the purpose."⁵⁰

On the other hand, there was an inability to deal with details in isolation from some frame of reference. Lanuti could not repeat discrete words spoken by someone else because there was no context that would situate them and provide them with meaning. If he had to recognize an object placed before him, however, he could use the proper name. Also, "Lanuti does not recognize a key presented on a cardboard, calling it a scrap of iron, but recognizes it at once correctly when the examiner puts it in the keyhole of a door." Finally, the patient found it quite difficult to copy drawings accurately, which requires attention to detail. The position on the page, as well as the shape and size of the original, were altered in such a manner that Goldstein concluded that Lanuti reproduced the *general impression* he received from the design. This submerging of detail in a larger framework so that the part has no existence led Goldstein to conclude that, "It is doubtful whether in his case we may speak of recognition of objects at all, because under all circumstances things seem to be for him only parts of a situation which he can master by action, never recognized in their relative independence and stability."⁵¹

In the same patient, then, there is an impairment of perceiving wholes and parts. The details do not represent the whole, and the whole is not an integration of the details. "Strictly speaking, there is no whole and no parts for him, but only a succession of different, unrelated impressions produced by the design."⁵² Lanuti did not organize or integrate the impressions that appeared before him; they seemed to come and go of their own free will. Goldstein calls this determinism "pathological concreteness," and it consists of freezing an object in one of its functions or aspects. The object becomes identified with one situation and cannot be recognized or utilized in other modes, and this petrification obscures the object's true nature. Identifying the object with one of its functions or contexts obviously blocks appreciation of its richness. Thus, discreteness of experience creates a distorted world in which the individual is passive and situation-bound. It is also a private world, since there can be no communication with anyone who regards objects from a standpoint different from the subject's one-sided perception. Since objects have only one definition, the meaning another person gives them renders them unrecognizable. Furthermore, it is

50. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

almost impossible for such patients to establish interpersonal relationships because they cannot recognize the same person in different situations. Lanuti, for example, could only recognize the doctor in the hospital. This capacity to grasp the *nature* of another being obviously reduces the subject's relationships to shallow, transient encounters.

In view of Goldstein's findings, pathology may be defined as a state of a subject's diminished control and direction of the world. The subject may attend to isolated details (particularism) and/or he may ignore the object's specificity and define it totally in terms of a larger category (a totalitarian outlook). In either case the world is seen from an increasingly one-sided perspective which reduces its generality and binds the subject to a given situation. The individual's organization, relation, and transcendence of particular aspects of the world are impaired, and his experience is determined by the situation in which he finds himself. The discreteness of reality opposes consistency and stability, which makes long-term relationships impossible. In addition, the narrowness of his perspective prevents sharing experience, and this eliminates social confirmation and support and leads to increased confusion and impoverishment. Although the individual's subjectivity is never completely obliterated, and thus he retains some capacity to structure and control what happens to him,⁵³ his influence is greatly diminished in comparison to the normal, and accordingly his life becomes haphazard and fragmented. Discussing this issue, Maurice Natanson says: "And it is precisely a reflexive awareness of order *qua* order which is in principle denied the morbid mind. . . . The morbid world is never our world but simply the world as it is. The subjective stance is ruled out. . . . The ordering principle of his individuality has metamorphosed or vanished altogether."⁵⁴ "The person who is bound by the particular or locates no limiting principle in the universal finds himself in an alien reality. He has been thrust out of our world into the aloneness of mental pathology. But he has not simply exchanged one world for another. On the contrary, he has given up central features of world as such. Although he may still be said to possess a world, it is more appropriate to say that he is possessed by a world. In any event, it is not the content of his new world that differs from the old, it is its very form."⁵⁵

We have endeavored to demonstrate that an outlook which separates the particular from the general obscures the nature of reality and renders the human subject trapped in a world that determines his experiences. This is characteristic of both individualistic and totalitarian ideology, which we have examined

53. Goldstein remarks that Lanuti was not entirely at a loss when asked to identify an object out of context. He had a vague idea of what the object might be, and manipulated it until he became more certain (p. 5). So it was possible for him to relate, to some extent, what he was presented with to something else that might throw it into relief. Of course, the range of possible relations was extremely small, and the act of relating was quite difficult — which accounts for his confusion — but he did retain some tiny fragment of what Goldstein calls the ability to abstract from the given.

54. E. W. Straus, M. Natanson, and H. Ey, *Psychiatry and Philosophy* (New York, Springer, 1969), p. 99.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

politically and psychologically. The only perspective which illuminates reality and the active human role in shaping it is a dialectical one which regards the general as defining the parts and integrating them into a recognizable pattern, and which conceives of the parts as contributing to that pattern and modifying it as they change. This perspective could lead to understanding individuals in terms of the social conditions they face and to an examination of how the society is directed, controlled, and changed by individuals. Furthermore, it would reveal individuals as both influencing and influenced by the society such that their experience is determined by, yet also transcendent of, the *status quo*.⁵⁶

This is not to say that in our culture we live dialectically and that it is necessary simply to alter our viewpoint. Obviously, most people are overwhelmed by our society, in which an estimated 0.5% of the population decides how the remaining 99.5% live.⁵⁷ Most people conform and manifest little or no autonomy, and it is precisely this passive obedience by the majority that makes totalitarian ideology believable. At the same time, individualist ideology seems plausible because people seek, and believe they find, personal retreats in which to escape oppression. However, two points remain. First of all, obedient and escapist behaviors do not comprise the totality of human activity. There are instances of purposive, socially directed acts whereby individuals learn from each other, such as love. If people are capable of this type of activity, then individualist and totalitarian outlooks are inadequate theories of human behavior. Human beings cannot be regarded, in general, as passive, frozen, unintelligent, unintelligible, non-social creatures. The dialectical view argues that all of human life is characterized by dialectical relationships, but that in certain cases, under well-defined conditions, the dialectical nature is to some extent flattened into a one-dimensional relationship in which the individual is overwhelmed by the outside and either acquiesces to its force or seeks a private retreat. In this state he becomes impoverished and disoriented; however, even in this essentially pathological condition the subject does not abdicate all his power to organize his world with reference to social reality.⁵⁸ Thus, the individualist and totalitarian views do not accurately describe even the pathological state. Second, the two doctrines discussed here cannot provide reasons or causes for the activities they observe and can only postulate them as natural. The dialectical theory, on the other hand, can account for the passivity and escapism so prevalent in this culture by revealing the social forces that influence people and the ways in which people feel obligated to deal with them. This view offers a way out of what is becoming generally recognized as an untenable situation. We must not only alter our ways of analyzing life, we must also change the quality of life itself.

56. Natanson says, "consciousness 'normalizes' its field of awareness by freeing itself of an extreme specificity and an overpowering generality" or, in other words, by "freeing the particular from its particularity without eliminating its specificity. In equivalent terms, the universal is given limits which prohibit its conceptual acceleration." *Ibid.*, p. 96.

57. This figure is arrived at by C. William Domhoff in *Who Rules America?* (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1967).

58. The work of R. D. Laing provides ample documentation of this phenomenon, which makes psychological reorganization possible.



Georg Lukács (1885-1971)

On June 4, 1971, Marxism lost its most important thinker since Marx. Born in Budapest on April 13, 1885, Lukács was known even before World War I through works on aesthetics such as *Die Seele und die Formen*, *Theorie der Roman*, etc. But it was *History and Class-Consciousness* (1923) that established him as the leading 20th century Marxist theoretician.

In this work, Lukács vindicated the Hegelian heritage of Marxism and showed how the Second International, in "positivizing" Marxism, had turned it into another sophisticated bourgeois ideology. Almost a decade before the publication of Marx's *Parisian Manuscripts*, Lukács articulated the theme of alienation as one of Marxism's major tenets and the dialectic as its life-line. Yet, this work retained many subtle neo-Kantian elements which made it difficult for Lukács to reconcile his brilliant theory with the complex praxis of the 1920's. Having underplayed the function of labor and sharply separated the "natural" and the "social" domains, Lukács found himself unable to adequately mediate between theory and praxis. Consequently, after the collapse of the German revolutionary movement he accepted Leninism as the missing mediation and, conceding Zinoviev's criticism, became a "Stalinist."

In the political context of the 1920's, Stalinism was by no means as evidently a degenerate form of Marxism as it has since become: in fact, the choice at that time was political impotence or Stalinism. Lukács' theoretical work in aesthetics and in philosophy (*Der Junge Hegel*) clearly indicates that he considered Stalinism a temporary aberration to be easily overcome when the U.S.S.R. attained technological and industrial maturity. In fact, in 1956, he participated in the Hungarian revolution with the Nagy government. Since then, he has repeatedly attacked Stalinism.

Lukács' major heritage to the American New Left is a Marxism which, although abstract in many respects, can function as a starting point for the analysis of modern society and can help in the determination of a concrete political praxis.

Already a cornerstone of modern continental philosophy, his theoretical work is just beginning to be studied in English-speaking countries. Although Lukács the man has died, for us he has just been born.

**The Second Telos International Conference
Buffalo, November 11-14, 1971**

Political Organization

Without question, the problem of organization is very urgent: the whole future of the American New Left depends on it. This conference will attempt to bring together an international group of activists, organizers and scholars interested in this issue.

To the extent that plans are still largely tentative, we would appreciate suggestions from our readers.

Topics

Thursday, November 11: Grass-roots Organization

Friday, November 12: Party Structures

Saturday, November 13: Totalization and Inter-mediations

Sunday, November 14: Bureaucracy and Post-revolutionary Problems

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